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M ost of the research done in contemporary anthropology tends to be rather inward-
looking; our debates have the habit of ignoring 
research done in neighbouring sciences. In 
contrast to this, Webb Keane’s ‘Ethical Life is a 
general treatise on what makes us ethical beings. 
Drawing from the findings and recent research 
done in cognitive science, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, and history, it is a wide-ranging 
cross-disciplinary inquiry into our moral 
foundations.
The only study of ethics with a similar 
wide-ranging scope (that I am familiar with) 
is Jonathan Haidt’s ‘The Righteous Mind’ 
(2012), which is a book about the evolutionary 
origins and cultural variance of our moral 
intuitions. However, while Haidt is conversant 
with anthropological studies of ethics, he sits 
firmly in a social psychological framework. In 
‘Ethical Life’, Keane’s approach is much more 
holistic and ambitious. Keane states right in 
the beginning that he does not hanker after a 
‘unified explanation of everything’ (p. 5). Instead, 
he argues that ethics cannot be satisfactorily 
accounted for solely from natural or social 
perspectives, but instead we have to look at how 
the different approaches articulate.
The book is divided to three parts, roughly 
corresponding to Keane’s three perspectives on 
ethical life. The first part, ‘Natures’, consists of 
an introduction and the first chapter. In the 
introduction, Keane discusses key concepts 
of the book and his take on the confusion 
surrounding the concepts of ‘morality’ and 
‘ethics’ in anthropology. Following what looks 
like an emerging consensus in the field (e.g. 
Faubion 2011; Laidlaw 2014), his definition of 
ethics—‘how one should live and what kind of 
person one should be’ (p. 20)—is derived from 
Bernard Williams’ argument about the shared 
nature of ethics (Williams 1986). ‘Morality’ is a 
subset of ethics, where rules or systematicity in 
general are foregrounded, but Keane notes that 
this is not a distinction that always can be made 
(p. 20).
One of Keane’s key terms in the 
introduction is reflexive awareness. In relation 
to this, he argues that ethics cannot be defined 
by rationality or self-consciousness, but when 
looking at what counts as ethical, an important 
part of it is the ‘dynamics of reflexivity’ (p. 26). 
For Keane, these ethical reflections emerge 
from social interaction, but in interaction 
with psychological and historical processes, or 
‘natural and social histories’ (pp. 3–4), if you will.
If we want to adhere to a non-deterministic 
conception of ethics, in which freedom still 
plays a role, we need a concept that explains 
how these different levels of psychological and 
socio-historical processes come to have ethical 
significance. Keane’s answer to this dilemma 
is what he calls ‘ethical affordances’. Building 
on James J. Gibson’s theory of affordances 
(1977), ethical affordances are ‘any aspects of 
people’s experiences and perceptions that they 
might draw on in the process of making ethical 
evaluations and decisions, whether consciously 
or not’ (p. 27). So, for example, our innate 
capability for intention-seeking can be a source 
of ethical affordances.
In the first chapter, Keane summarizes 
the psychological research done on ethics, for 
example on empathy and altruism, reciprocity 
and intention-seeking. He argues that even 
though it is important to take into account the 
studies on moral emotions, they do not sum 
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up to something that we can call ‘ethics’ by 
themselves. The psychological perspective has 
to be complemented with a socio-historical 
account.
The second part, ‘Interactions’, starts with a 
chapter outlining research done on conversation 
analysis, and how that research points to the 
fact that the outcome of a conversation is always 
contingent, and it rests on an evaluative dynamic 
that draws on resources outside the immediate 
context of interaction. So, instead of the 
normative claim that ethics should be a study 
of freedom, which, for example, Laidlaw (2014) 
makes, Keane comes to a similar conclusion, on 
basis of empirical evidence. The undetermined 
and context-transcending features of interaction 
mean that interaction has emergent properties 
independent of our psychological dispositions.
The third chapter talks about how 
ethnographic evidence problematizes the 
psychological and sociological perspectives 
presented in the book so far. So, while a lot 
of interaction depends on widely-shared 
psychological properties, these properties, as 
ethical affordances, are elaborated or suppressed 
in various ways in different communities. For 
example, Keane discusses how the Sumbanese 
concept of dewa takes up Goffmanian face-
work as an ethical affordance, and links it to 
spirit agency and other concepts to create a 
distinctive ethics of recognition and dignity. 
When somebody is perceived to have failed in 
a gift exchange, the person can be referred to 
as having a ‘hindered dewa’ (p. 115). A recipient 
of a generous exchange is considered to have a 
powerful dewa. The condition of a person’s dewa 
can be observed by others, and it also reacts to 
others’ actions. A weakened dewa can also be 
manipulated by ethical practice, for example, by 
sponsoring a feast.
The other ethnographic example discussed 
at length is the underplay of intention-seeking 
(‘opacity doctrine’), and how this is a specific 
way to problematize ethical challenges in 
everyday life. For example, the Mopan Maya, 
studied by Eve Danziger (2006), do not make 
a distinction between a lie and an erroneous 
statement—a speaker’s intentions are not 
relevant when judging what people say. This 
does not mean that the Mopan are unable to 
make such a distinction. The point is that the 
practice of speaking contains a sacred morality 
for the Mopan. The connection of words and 
their signifiers overrides the intentions of their 
speakers.
The fourth chapter maps out the ways 
everyday interaction is linked to ethical 
reflection. According to Keane, systematic 
moralities rely on features of interaction, and 
the ethics of interaction draw from the rules 
outlined by morality systems. Here Keane 
analyses the interplay between interaction, 
moralities and ethical practice. He criticizes 
Jarrett Zigon’s idea of ‘moral breakdown’ (2007) 
as being too simplistic with its neat division of 
unreflective everyday life and reflexive moral 
crises. Ethics is not limited to moments of 
reflection, and moral awareness is more than 
solitary pondering of dilemmas. Ethical life is 
intersubjective, and often habitual. To argue this 
point, Keane leverages research from linguistic 
anthropology, especially on ‘voice’ (e.g. Hill 
1995; Lempert 2012). The relation of a voice 
to its speaker varies, and the ethical positions 
these voices depict have differing relationships 
to their speakers. The evidence simply does not 
support the kind of model that Zigon proposes. 
The third part of the book, ‘Histories’, 
introduces a social historical viewpoint to the 
analysis of ethics, discussing how morality 
systems and ethics emerge and change over time. 
His main examples in Chapter Five are the rise 
of the abolitionist movement in the 19th century 
and the technique of ‘consciousness-raising’ 
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in the American feminism of 1960s and 
70s. They are cases of what Foucault called 
‘problematization’, a form of reflection that 
depends on our ability to self-distance. Self-
distancing, an innate cognitive capacity that 
is further developed in social interaction, is an 
ethical affordance that can turn into a process of 
objectification.
Chapters Six and Seven look at how ethical 
change is effected and becomes stabilized, by 
examining piety movements in Papua New 
Guinea and Egypt, and Vietnamese communist 
revolutionaries. Keane’s main point is that in 
some historical situations, people come to see 
themselves as having ethical and historical 
agency, and this is due to historical objects 
available as affordances to them.
The main argument in ‘Ethical Life’ is that 
ethics rest on three foundations: first-, second- 
and third-person perspectives. These can be 
grasped as linguistic forms: inner dialogue, 
conversation, and objectified language. They 
can also be understood as different kinds 
of affordances: psychological dispositions, 
conversational forms, and historical objects. 
Keane argues that a crucial feature of ethical life 
is a movement between these three perspectives, 
and none of the perspectives alone are sufficient 
for understanding ethical life.
To me, the most laudable aspect of ‘Ethical 
Life’ is the way it avoids the parochiality that 
at times troubles anthropological research on 
ethics. The argument of the book opens into 
psychology, cognitive science, and history, and 
is in dialogue with them, while still justifying 
anthropology as a necessary perspective to 
understand the variance in ethical practices. It 
will surely stimulate a lot of research on moral 
systems and ethical practice. 
RefeRences
Danziger, Eve 2006. The Thought that Counts: 
Interactional Consequences of Variation in Cultural 
Theories of Meaning. In N. Enfield and S. C. 
Levinson (eds.), Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, 
Cognition and Interaction. Oxford: Berg.
Faubion, James D. 2011. An Anthropology of Ethics. 
Cambridge University Press.
Gibson, James 1977. The Theory of Affordances. In 
R. Shaw and J. Bransford (eds.), Perceiving, Acting, 
and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Haidt, Jonathan 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why 
Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New 
York: Pantheon Books.
Hill, Jane H. 1995. The Voices of Don Gabriel: 
Responsibility and Self in a Modern Mexicano 
Narrative. In D. Tedlock (ed.), The Dialogic Emergence 
of Culture. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Laidlaw, James 2014. The Subject of Virtue: An 
Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Lempert, M. 2012. Discipline and Debate: The 
Language of Violence in a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Williams, Bernard 1986. Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press.
Zigon, Jarrett 2007. Moral Breakdown and the 
Ethical Demand: A Theoretical Framework for an 
Anthropology of Moralities. Anthropological Theory 7 
(2): 131–150.
HEIKKI WILENIUS
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI
heikki.wilenius@helsinki.fi
